DEAN RICHARDS AND THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
Dean Richards began his law teaching at the University of
Iowa in the fall of 1898. Two years later the Association of
American Law Schools was organized and in 1901 the first
annual meeting of this Association was held. This first meeting Dean Richards attended and from that time until his death
no one has had a more active part in the growth and development of this Association and the accomplishment of its one
object, "The improvement of legal education in America, especially in the law schools." It is fitting, therefore, that some
statement should be made with reference to Dean Richards'
activities in connection with this organization.
In the early years of the Association, Dean Richards was a
member of its Executive Committee and later its President,
and again on the Executive Committee. It would require a detailing of the entire history of this Association year by year if
Dean Richards' influence were to be properly presented, for
there was hardly a meeting but that he was called upon for
some service in the constructive work of the organization,
either in planning or outlining the work of law schools through
committee study and recommendation, or in participation in
the development of the law in various Round Table Conferences, or in the presentation of papers or addresses. Dean
Richards' attitude, and the basis of his influence in the development of legal education through the Association of American
Law Schools can best be shown by quoting from his address as
President and his discussion of papers at recent meetings.
In setting forth his ideas he used a directness of approach
with an unstudied cleverness of expression that carried conviction. He had a way of turning an article upside down to
note its price mark and the place of its manufacture. He was
an expert at scraping off the gilding to determine the honesty
of the sustaining metal. He could detect pretense or self-deception with unerring accuracy, and he had a remarkable ability to discover the inner workings of men's minds. These
qualities made his statements in debate or in presentation of
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his own views most effective. A sharpness of wit and a use of
homely illustration made the expression of his opinion a delight to those who heard him, particularly to those who did not
disagree with him.
In his address as President of the Association of American
Law Schools he made a comparison of the progress made in
medical and in legal education, and showed the manner in
which the medical profession had cleaned out the schools operated for pecuniary profit. Through their experience he
pointed the way which the bar should follow. Nothing tells
more clearly the accuracy of his aim than the fact that commercialized law schools have, ever since his address, felt impelled to combat his arguments and to recount the terrible injuries which they allege have resulted from cleaning up, what
were in reality, the quack hatcheries of the medical profession.
We are today striving hard to make the public and the profession realize what he then pointed out, that the certain result of preparation for the bar in schools of low standards is
"a host of shrewd young men, imperfectly educated,
crammed so they can pass the bar examinations, all
deeply impressed with the philosophy of getting on,
but viewing the Code of Ethics with uncomprehending eyes."
Dean Richards' peculiar ability to bring to earth for examination any new plan of approach to the study of law sometimes brought upon him the charge of being a conservative,
particularly by those who were seeking to pilot the new planes.
But his conservatism was most constructive and was only that
of one who insists that a cross country flight should not be attempted until the plane has been thoroughly tried out on the
home proving grounds.
Three years ago at the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Dean Richards discussed the emphasis being
placed on legal philosophy in law teaching:
"The law professor has become a philosopher. We
hear a great deal about philosophy nowadays in the
law schools. We hear about 'sociological jurisprudence' and 'analytical jurisprudence' and the 'factual
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approach' and the 'functional approach' and several
other approaches I can't think of just now. Now,
this epidemic is spreading all over the country, and
the peculiar thing about it is that the symptoms are
not the same in any two institutions. There seems
to be a common tendency to spread, but pathological
conditions are different. If one school breaks out
with 'functional approach,' no other school ever has
it. It may break out with something else, but never
with the 'functional approach.' That is sacred to the
school that first had it.
"One of the first symptoms that seems to be
common to all outbreaks of this disease is a sort of
glossarial rash that precedes the philosophical outbreak.
"The disquieting thing about it is that it seems to
be catching. Time was when if a man philosophized
about law, or anything else, we could tiptoe out of the
room when we got tired of it, but now it is thrust
upon us."
These statements are typically Richardsesque:
"When you look through the catalogs, you don't
find much said about practice any more, but a great
deal about legal philosophy. Even in the pictorial
section the picture of 'Our Courtroom' is no longer
featured in the center of the group. There has been
a very great change. We have become philosophers,
or are on the way to becoming philosophers, and we
ought to have in the process of time at least sixtyfour different schools of philosophy in the Law School
(Sixty-four being the number of law
Association."
schools belonging to the Association at that time.)
He was a master of the use of clever irony. Note his
suggestion as to the manner in which the law professor may
impress the practitioner:
"The only way to get along with the bar is the way
we are getting along with them. Don't meet them on
their ground, but make them meet us on our ground,
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and when you get them in a philosophical atmosphere
they are lost. To hold that advantage we must continue to philosophise, and never say anything more
about the practice courses."
Dean Richards' courage and directness in expressing his
views was well illustrated in the same address in his sharp
criticism of the attitude of the bar of that time with reference
to higher standards:
"The bar is always talking about the law being a
learned profession. I am tired of that phrase 'learned
profession.' The bar as a whole does little or nothing
to make it real. If there is any attempt to make the
bar learned or near-learned, there is always opposition from them. Who make up the faculties of all the
poor law schools we have in the United States? Members of the bar, and of the courts. They will denounce
chicanery and the low tone of the bar, and then run
and deliver their lecture in some school that is inducing young men with insufficient preparation and improper training to aspire to a career at the bar."
At the meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools last December a symposium was held under the title
"Modern Movements in Legal Education," in which papers
were read by representatives from several leading law schools
describing or proposing certain new schemes for the teaching
of law, some of them departing rather radically from present
methods. Dean Richards in his inimitable way thus brought
the various planes of thought to safe landings for careful inspection:
"As I sat here listening to the very able papers, I
recalled the story of a Western railroad attorney. He
was a lawyer of the old school, who appreciated good
whisky, and played poker with skill. He knew all the
big shippers by their first names, and was a very useful man for his company. In his later years he was
called into a conference with the representatives of
other roads to consider the question of freight rates.
The modern bespectacled expert was there, with his
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statistical tables and graphs, holding forth at great
length. After our friend had listened for an hour or
so to this discussion, most of which was unintelligible
to him, he was asked for his opinion. He replied:
'Well, I'll tell you; I think it's time we all went out and
had a drink!'"
If he suspected an attitude of superiority he could deal
with it most delightfully:
"An Eastern friend of mine, who has read a great
deal of history, remarked to me, rather unkindly, I
thought, that his study of history had led him to the
conclusion that the highest type of civilization never
spreads very far from the sea coast.. . If my friend's
observations are sound, I suppose those of us who live
west of the Alleghanies need not worry, since, if the
projects presented to us today are the outpourings of
the highest type of civilization, they will never get to
us. But one can never be sure. Perhaps we should
take precautions. Sporadic cases of factual and
functional approach, rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities, jural relations, etc., have been noted or
proclaimed in schools west of the Alleghanies, but so
far the Corn Belt and the Pacific Coast are untouched."
Some of Dean Richards' friends liked to twit him about
his early practice experience in the State of Missouri, claiming
that it had left a permanent impress upon his character with
reference to the ease with which he might be convinced as to
new and unusual proposals.
His attitude was well illustrated in the suggestion that
those proposing the new plans demonstrate their efficiency
before general adoption by law schools would seem desirable:
"We are glad to see these schools, with high reputations and strong financial backing, willing to put
these ideas to the test of practical application. We
shall watch the experiment with interest, not expecting anything very decisive in the way of results. If
these schools have great teachers And intelligent
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'poison squads,' the results will be favorable, no
doubt, for an intelligent subject can stand a great
deal of intellectual punishment without appreciable
impairment."
His ability to take a birds-eye view of any new movement
or proposal was shown in this further comment:
"The philosophical stirrings which these projects
indicate can be detected in any full-time faculty today.
They are the to-be-expected results, when full-time
teachers, caught early, were substituted in our faculties in place of the hard-bitten lawyers and judges of
a generation ago. We are now definitely headed back
toward the continental ideal of legal education. We
have created a situation out of which philosophers are
born, or in process of being born."
He was never misled either by old labels or new ones. His
advice as to the manner of securing consideration and adoption
by the profession of modern ideas as to the content of the law
courses, shows both his keen insight and his practicality:
"Every intelligent student of our English law recognizes the strength and importance of the social
forces back of the law which cause changes in its
scope and direction. The law makes articulate this
social pressure. We want our students to know and
appreciate these forces, and feel that they must know
and appreciate them, if they are to become sound
lawyers. The question, then, is not the desirability of
this knowledge; that, I think, is conceded; but what is
the most effective method of getting it? It seems to
me that the methods presented in these papers are
open to the objection that they are calculated unduly
to alarm the patient. All the familiar stage settings
of the accepted order are changed. Old familiar labels
are removed, and strange new ones substituted. There
is a challenge in the whole proceeding that begets
opposition. Men do not object to new ideas, if they
are not so labeled; but they are very stubborn about
their labels, and their habitual procedure, and you
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cannot hustle them. President Lowell, in his book on
Public Opinion, said very wisely that history shows
that no great reforms have been won by frontal
attacks, but always by flank movements. We must
bore from within. The radicals in the labor unions
have the right idea. They don't stay outside and
fight the unions, but join the unions and attempt to
instill their ideas into labor union precepts. That is
not fraud, I suppose, but psychology, even admitting
there is a twilight zone between fraud and psychology
that is hard to define."
His saneness and sense of proportion permitted him to
keep an even balance with his eye on the main purpose of legal
education. This was his comment on the place of the social
sciences in law teaching:
"It is now said that the law is not self-sufficient;
that to understand it we must go back and in our
classrooms discuss the great 'energizing forces' that
lie back of our law. To that we all agree, in part. It
is said the law but gives sanctions to economic and
social forces; if that is true, then by all means turn
our law schools into schools of economics and sociology, and treat our law as procedure only. To accept
this idea is to close your eyes to the fact that, while
the law does give its sanctions, it has very profoundly
contributed to the determination and scope of these
social forces. Law cannot be ignored as a factor in
economic theory, any more than economics can be
ignored in legal theory.
"The economists and sociologists loom large in the
world today.

.

. They are working in the same gen-

eral fields as ourselves, trying to plat the probable
course of that very uncertain and contrary creature,
man. The law, while necessarily more empirical,
has submitted its theories rather successfully to the
acid test of practical application. We need the aid of
economists, and they need ours. We should work with
them, but not surrender to them."
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In considering the content of one of the courses which
had been described, wherein some of the readings suggested
included Keyser's Mathematical Philosophy; Karl Pearson's
Grammarof Science; Gilbert Lewis' Anatomy of Science; A. D.
Ritchie's Scientific Method; Bertrand Russell's A.B.C. of
Atoms; John Dewey's Experimental Logic; the same author's
Human Nature and Conduct; Mill's Logic; F. C. S. Schiller's
FormalLogic; H. E. Cunningham's Text-Book of Logic; P. W.
Bridgman's Logic of Modern Physics; Frederick Barry's
Scientific Habit of Thought, Dean Richards remarked:
"I have no doubt, after reading [the instructor's]
description of his course, that he got a great deal of
good out of it; but I am rather skeptical of the benefits which his students derived from it, if they were
the usual type of students with which we are familiar.
I suspect there is not a great deal of difference between a Yale student and the students of other
schools. . . . The list of readings suggested seems
a greater burden than their immature shoulders can
bear. I would feel very sorry for them, if I did not
know their resiliency, and the ease with which they
take on a protective coloration."
Reference to certain proposed law courses brought
forth this discriminating observation concerning research:
"We have failed to appreciate that not every man
is capable of doing research work in a productive
way. We have apparently assumed that all we need
to make a research man is time and money. We give
our candidate time and money, and say to him, 'Now,
research.' He may, and he may not; probably not.
What he will always do is to collect materials, read
and digest what everyone has said on the subject,
compile mountains of cases, and card indexes galore.
The results will be embalmed in a long, dull dissertation, rehashing other men's ideas. His thesis is
printed, bound, and filed away. He receives a degree
perhaps, and is thenceforth known as 'Doctor.' But
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the end is not yet. The next generation of prospective
Doctors must read this contribution and combine it
in a new rehash, and so on and on-a mounting pile
of words and a diminishing stock of ideas. . . . The
lawyer and the judge look to the law teacher to blaze
a path through the myriad of special instances; do
not disappoint him with colossal compilations, that
block the way, rather than clear it. Do not bewilder
him with new terminology and philosophical hairsplitting."
Dean Richards' connection with the Association of American Law Schools has been responsible in large measure for
the sound progress made in legal education during the time
of its most rapid development. In addition to his many affirmative contributions he rendered during this constructive period an invaluable service in a capacity that might be
compared to that of a careful building inspector.
The substantial progress of professional and learned
societies would be materially advanced if each organization
might have one Dean Richards to cause them to recheck their
proposals and build only on foundations that are both suitable
and substantial, rather than to proceed to an elaborate superstructure where materials of great value may be wasted or
discarded because the whole has been erected too rapidly under
the influence of the high enthusiasm which tends to accompany
a building boom.
Unfortunately for education and for civilization there is
no mould in which are cast such men as Dean Richards. They
come but on rare occasions, leaving the world saner and
happier for their sojourn.
H. C. HORACK

